Our purpose is to examine a firm's optimal output decision and valuation when its shareholders hold a limited number of risky assets. The primary theoretical result indicates that the marketto-book ratio is a function of the degree of shareholder diversification. Our theory suggests a negative relationship between a firm's market-to-book ratio and shareholder diversification. (MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIO; ANTIDIVERSIFICATION; MAYSHAR CAPM)
Introduction
The relationship between valuation and microeconomic structure under conditions of uncertainty is a contemporary concern. Many articles have appeared recently that link valuation, in the context of the standard capital asset pricing model of Sharpe (1964) , Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) , to a firm's product and factor markets. The most noteworthy to the following analysis are Booth (1981) , Conine (1983) , Greenberg et al. (1978) , Harpaz-Thomadakis (1982) , Hite (1977) , Lin (1979) , Long-Racette (1974), Subrahmanyam-Thomadakis (1980) and Thomadakis (1976) .
The purpose of this article is to examine a firm's output decision and market value to book value ratio when its shareholders hold a limited number of risky assets; that is, they hold a subset of the market portfolio. This relationship in this framework has not been examined previously, and it integrates financial valuation with the microeconomic structure of a firm's optimal output decision in a partial equilibrium.' The impact of this limited diversification is examined in the framework of the capital asset pricing model, hereafter CAPM, as formulated by Mayshar (1979) , (1981) . The microeconomic analogue of the Modigliani-Miller (1961) true growth model, resulting from market imperfections, is developed in a world of limited shareholder diversification.
The primary theoretical result indicates that the market to book ratio is a function of the degree of shareholder diversification, hereafter antidiversification. An intriguing implication of our model is a rationale for converting a public firm to a private firm, i.e. "taking a company private." As in many areas of finance, such as dividend policy, management should be aware of its shareholder clientele. For example, in our model a few undiversified investors, ceteris paribus, would place a higher value on the firm than would many diversified investors. A suggestion is presented as to how management can determine easily the degree to which its shareholders are diversified. There are three pragmatic (and related) reasons for examining how antidiversification affects a firm's valuation. First, the observed behavior of individual investors demonstrates that the majority hold imperfectly diversified portfolios.2 The second reason is that, since the inception of testing the standard CAPM, researchers have often found that variance (in addition to beta) is a significant explanatory variable of returns.3 While all empirical tests do not agree, the evidence suggests that variance not be overlooked. Third, surveys have shown that the standard CAPM has gained a widespread acceptance for cost of capital estimation for both regulated and nonregulated firms. Considering the evidence of average investor stock holdings, results of empirical testing of the CAPM, and widespread acceptance of the standard CAPM for cost of equity capital estimation, the question of an optimal output decision in a world of antidiversification is of more significance than simply theoretical argument.
?2 provides a review of the Mayshar CAPM. In ?3 the theoretical relationship between valuation and antidiversification is developed. In ?4 we empirically examine the relationship between market-to-book ratios and shareholder diversification. The final section concludes the analysis.
Asset Pricing with Antidiversification
The absence of transaction costs in the standard capital asset pricing model is often viewed as being a minor idealization. As Mayshar ( 1979) , (1981 ) has shown, however, even with relatively small fixed transaction costs the risk premium of an asset will depend upon a weighted average of its covariance with the market and its own-variance.4 This result obtains because with transaction costs it is apparent that an investor may not trade in all risk assets. As a result, variance although diversifiable, can be relevant to the pricing of a risk asset. In the standard CAPM with no market frictions, all investors own the market portfolio and therefore are totally diversified. Variance plays no direct role in the valuation of a risk asset. Transaction costs in the Mayshar CAPM include not only brokers' fees and losses due to the bid-ask spread but also include various other obstacles to trade, such as nondivisibility of assets, shortsale restrictions, institutional restraints, and even the subjective costs of managing one's own portfolio. For a further discussion of the nature of transaction costs see Mayshar ( 1978) .
The weights, applied to both an assets covariance with the market and its own variance, are a function of the degree of diversification of the firm's shareholders. The implication on a sample of individual income tax returns from 1971 considering only dividend paying stocks, 35.15 percent of investors held only one stock, 50.51 percent of investors held no more than two, and 10.72 percent held ten or more stocks. Blume, Friend and Crockett (1974) in a study that included nondividend paying stocks found the median number of holdings of stock was two, while the average was 3.41. In both Blume and Friend (1975) and (1978) other measures of diversification were employed with the results confirming the conclusion that individual investors are, on average, highly undiversified.
3In an early test, Douglas (1968) found residual variance to be a significant explanatory variable. MillerScholes (1972) also found residual variance to be a significant explanatory variable and concluded that skewness in the return generating process caused the observed association. In contrast, Fama and MacBeth (1973), using portfolio grouping procedures, found that coefficient of residual variance was not significantly different from zero. Roll (1977) argued that the grouping procedures reduced the skewness in return distributions and accounted for the difference between Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Miller-Scholes (1972) . However, Friend, Westerfield and Granito (1978) discovered that with broader market indexes residual standard deviation was extremely significant in both individual asset and grouping tests, thus suggesting that return skewness may not be an adequate explanation. Levy (1979) , in an analysis similar to Mayshar (1981) , also found that variance was a very significant explanatory variable (even more so than beta). We recognize that even though tests use residual variance and variance, in theory they are not the same. That is, residual variance is that part of variance that is diversifiable. Lakonishok-Shapiro (1986) also examines the impact of variance in the return generating process.
We acknowledge Roll's (1977) criticism which suggests that a valid test of the CAPM has not been made, and it is doubtful that a valid test can be made.
4 A similar result has been shown by Levy (1979) , and has been argued by Lintner ( Table 1 can be found data available from quarterly reports filed by institutions with the SEC (this covers investment advisers, banks, insurance companies and mutual funds). It is evident that substantial variation exists in the institutional ownership of common stock, even within an industry. Surveys also have shown that these types of companies use the standard CAPM in the estimation of their cost of equity capital. The average institutional ownership of all publicly traded companies in the U.S., at monthend June 1986, was 35.9 percent. While institutional investment concentration certainly changes over time, this evidence, linked with the aforementioned survey evidence of average individual investor stock holdings, results of empirical testing of the CAPM, and recognition that the standard CAPM has received widespread acceptance for cost of capital estimation, suggest that management should be aware of its shareholder clientele for its impact on decision-making.
The Model
In this section we derive a firm's market value to book value ratio in a world of antidiversification. The development is similar to Thomadakis ( 1976) , SubrahmanyamThomadakis (1980) , and Conine (1983) . An all-equity firm in a taxless world is assumed.
We first rewrite equation ( Rearranging (2) and using an approximation so that the firm specific Xjdy can be replaced by X a market-wide parameter,7'8 we obtain 
The total revenue for the jth firm is then expressed as

TRj = diQ ((5)/)
where TRj is the total revenue.
The variable cost per unit sold is denoted by Vj and for mathematical tractability is assumed constant. After optimal output is determined, sufficient capital is obtained at a cost of K per unit of output. The per unit liquidation value also is assumed to be K. Normatively, this liquidation value will represent a return of initial capital. The random end-of-period cash flow j then is given by Un0)/?7] -VjQj+KQ-.
Since the Mayshar CAPM is cast in a single period, the firm is assumed to invest sufficiently at the beginning of the period to produce the optimal output. At the end of the period the firm adjusts the price to clear the market. All trading is assumed to take place at the end of the period, when realization of total revenue, cost and liquidation value occurs.
The optimal output will be the Qj which maximizes the net present value of the firm, SKQj. We now express equation (3) and Z* represents optimal output. Equation (9) is an implicit function for optimal output that cannot be solved in closed form for an arbitrary price elasticity of demand. Conceptually, the net present value is the present value of market imperfections (or monopoly rents) arising from barriers to entry and is seen to be a function of shareholder diversification. In the Modigliani-Miller world, equation (9) 
The relationship between shareholder diversification, dj, and the NPV optimizing output, Z *, is worthy of examination even though equation ( 10) is not tractable. A drawing of the left-hand side (LHS) versus the right-hand side (RHS) of ( 10) for various values of f is presented in Figure 1 and clearly illustrates the relationship. The solution set  where the LHS equals the RHS is given by the intersections, marked by circles, a smaller  f (i.e., a larger dj) , which signifies more shareholder diversification, increases the optimal output.
The relationship between shareholder diversification and a firm's market-to-book ratio is somewhat clouded given that optimal output is itself a function of dj. Given Z*, however, a straightforward reading of equation ( 11 ) shows that a smaller f (i.e., a larger dj) which signifies more shareholder diversification, decreases the market-to-book ratio.
An interesting question is what happens to a firm's market-to-book ratio under perfectly competitive pricing (i.e., ?7 goes to infinity). In the limit, equation ( 11) 
Empirical Analysis
In this section we empirically examine the result that a firm's market-to-book ratio is negatively related to shareholder diversification.
Our proxy for shareholder diversification, c4, is the aforementioned percentage of shares held by institutional investors, a measure also used by Lakonishok and Shapiro ( 1986) in the same context. To hold constant the micro-effects, we examined 37 industries using 1985 year-end data from Forbes January 13, 1986 for the following regression (regulated industries were eliminated because market-to-book ratios are constrained close to one) 13 MBj = aeo + al dj + Ej where (13) MBj = the market price-to-book ratio, dj = proportion of outstanding shares held by institutional investors, ar0, a1 = intercept and slope estimates, respectively, and Ei = error term. The results are presented in Table 2 . Of the 37 industries, 14 have statistically significant negative coefficients (8 at 5% and 6 at 10%) with only one significant coefficient being positive (at 10%). Thus, 14 of the 37 industries are consistent with the theoretical result which predicts a negative relationship between price-to-book ratio and shareholder diversification. The statistically nonsignificant results (of the remaining 22 industries 14 did have a negative sign) may, of course, result from many factors, such as, homogeneity within industry groups and small sample sizes. Future research might look at time series as well as other cross-sectional models.
Conclusion
The linkage between financial valuation and the product and factor markets faced by the firm is an area rapidly developing in the literature. Our purpose is to examine a firm's optimal output decision and valuation when its shareholders hold a limited number of risky assets. The primary theoretical result indicates that the market-to-book ratio is a function of the degree of shareholder diversification. Our theory suggests a negative relationship between a firm's market-to-book ratio and shareholder diversification. We suggest how management can ascertain the degree of its shareholders' diversification. Finally, our empirical results, while not conclusive, should inspire future research.
